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Abstract
Adversarial examples, intentionally designed inputs tending
to mislead deep neural networks, have attracted great atten-
tion in the past few years. Although a series of defense strate-
gies have been developed and achieved encouraging model
robustness, most of them are still vulnerable to the more com-
monly witnessed corruptions, e.g., Gaussian noise, blur, etc.,
in the real world. In this paper, we theoretically and empir-
ically discover the fact that there exists an inherent connec-
tion between adversarial robustness and corruption robust-
ness. Based on the fundamental discovery, this paper further
proposes a more powerful training method named Progres-
sive Adversarial Training (PAT) that adds diversified adver-
sarial noises progressively during training, and thus obtains
robust model against both adversarial examples and corrup-
tions through higher training data complexity. Meanwhile, we
also theoretically find that PAT can promise better generaliza-
tion ability. Experimental evaluation on MNIST, CIFAR-10
and SVHN show that PAT is able to enhance the robustness
and generalization of the state-of-the-art network structures,
performing comprehensively well compared to various aug-
mentation methods. Moreover, we also propose Mixed Test
to evaluate model generalization ability more fairly.
Introduction
State-of-the-art deep learning models have shown signif-
icant successes in many tasks, including computer vision
(Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012), natural lan-
guage processing (Bahdanau, Cho, and Bengio 2014) and
speech (Hinton et al. 2012). Their performances are usually
promised by training using sufficient clean data. However, in
real-world environment, it is usually impractical to acquire
entirely clean data without any noises, such as adversarial
examples and corruptions (Hendrycks and Dietterich 2019),
which have been proven to pose potential threats to deep
learning systems (Liu et al. 2019; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
Bengio 2016), especially those deployments in safety and
security-critical environments. Therefore, it is crucial to well
understand the noise robustness of deep neural networks.
In the past few years, great efforts have been devoted
to exploring model robustness to the adversarial noises (or
adversarial examples), maliciously constructed impercepti-
ble perturbations that fool deep learning models, from the
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views of attack (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014a;
Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018) and defense (Xie et
al. 2018; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017; Madry et
al. 2017). Most of the existing defense methods attempt to
build adversarially robust models via supplying adversaries
with non-computable gradients. Though they successfully
make the deep models predict stably when encountering
the adversarial examples, they were still easily defeated by
circumventing obfuscated gradients (Athalye, Carlini, and
Wagner 2018). Recently, adversarial training, appeared as
a strong defense algorithm by adversarially data augmenta-
tion, has shown the strong capability of offering robust mod-
els against adversarial examples.
Besides the progress in robustness to adversarial exam-
ples, recent studies have also paid attention to improving
model robustness to another common noises named corrup-
tions (Zheng et al. 2016; Sun et al. 2018). In the real-world
deep learning systems, corruptions like Gaussian blur and
snow are more likely to witness than adversarial examples.
Dodge and Karam found that deep learning models behave
distinctly subhuman to input images with Gaussian noises.
Likewise, deep learning models show weak performance
on various corruptions including blur, pixelation and other
types of noises (Hendrycks and Dietterich 2019).
Though the existence of noises especially in real-world
environment has drawn intense concerns about the robust-
ness of deep models, the literature mainly focused on ei-
ther corruptions (Zheng et al. 2016; Sun et al. 2018) or ad-
versarial noises (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017;
Madry et al. 2017). A very few studies have investigated
the problem from the view of generalized noise robustness.
For example, Fawzi, Moosavi-Dezfooli, and Frossard stud-
ied the robustness of classifiers from adversarial examples
to random noises and tried to build a robust model from the
view of curvature constraints. Fawzi, Fawzi, and Fawzi drew
the relationship between in-distribution robustness and un-
constrained robustness. More recently, Ford et al. found that
adversarial robustness is closely related to robustness un-
der certain kinds of distributional shifts, i.e., additive Gaus-
sian noise. Despite the promising progress, there still re-
main open questions that need to be answered for deep un-
derstanding model robustness: Is there any relationship be-
tween the different noises such as adversarial noises and
corruptions? Could we build strong models against them?
To answer these questions, this paper first dedicates theo-
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retical and empirical analyses to demonstrate that there ex-
ists an inherent correlation between adversarial robustness
and corruption robustness, which potentially explains why
existing adversarial defensive methods may somewhat im-
prove model robustness against corruptions. Based on our
theoretical finding, we further devise a powerful training
method named Progressive Adversarial Training (PAT) to
improve both adversarial and corruption robustness. Differ-
ent from the conventional methods that achieve model ro-
bustness by employing more training data (Schmidt et al.
2018; Sun, Zhu, and Lin 2019), in PAT the diversified ad-
versarial noises are aggregated, augmented and injected pro-
gressively, which are proven to be beneficial on improving
both the adversarial and corruption robustness. We also theo-
retically prove that PAT can also promise models with strong
generalization ability. Extensive experiments on MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and SVHN indicate that PAT shows comprehen-
sively excellent results on both adversarial and corruption
noise compared to various augmentation methods. More-
over, in order to conduct unbiased evaluation, we also pro-
pose Mixed Test to evaluate model generalization ability
more fairly.
Related Work
Adversarial robustness. In order to improve model robust-
ness against adversarial examples, many adversarial train-
ing based methods have been proposed and proved to be
comparatively competitive through experiments among oth-
ers. Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy firstly tried to im-
prove model robustness against adversarial attacks through
adversarial training which intuitively adds a regularization
term and directly feeds adversarial examples during training.
Madry et al. adversarially trained moderately the most ro-
bust model with the PGD augmented adversarial examples,
whereas it consumes too much time and fails to generalize
well on clean examples. Meanwhile, Sinha, Namkoong, and
Duchi proposed an adversarial training algorithm with a sur-
rogate loss which proved by theoretical analysis, but it is
only confined to the small dataset, e.g., MNIST. Besides, ad-
versarial noises are also calculated and added to each hidden
layer during training in order to tackle the overfitting prob-
lem in (Sankaranarayanan et al. 2018). However, adversarial
training still fails to handle more aggressive iterative attack
and remains questionable to corruption robustness.
Corruption robustness. When it goes to the robust model
towards corruptions, rare defense methods have been pro-
posed. To improve model robustness against JPEG com-
pression, Zheng et al. proposed stability training to stabilize
model behavior against small input distortions. By inves-
tigating feature distribution shift within convolutional neu-
ral networks, Sun et al. employed feature quantization tech-
niques to deal with distorted images including motion blur,
salt and pepper. More recently, Metz et al. drew insights
from meta-learning which uses a learned optimizer to build
a robust model against input noises, e.g., translations.
Noise Robustness
In this section, we introduce the formal definition of noise
robustness, taking the widely studied and used convolutional
neural networks in image classification as the basic deep
models.
Basic Deep Models
Given a training set S = {si}n1 and a test set Z = {zi}m1 with
a feature vector x ∈ X and a label y ∈ Y , the deep super-
vised learning model tries to learn a mapping or classifica-
tion function f : X → Y or RD→ {1, ...,K} as the mapping
from input examples to output labels, where D is the dimen-
sion of input examples, {1, ...,K} is the corresponding labels
of output. More precisely, fS(θ ;x,y) represents the predic-
tion results of input (x,y) after the model is trained on train-
ing set S. We use the log-loss in the image classification
problem as follows:
`(θ ;x,y) =−
m
∑
i=1
yi log(
e f (θ ;x,yi)
∑mj=1 e f (θ ;x,y j)
),
where f (θ ;x,yi) denotes the value of position yi in predic-
tion result. For the single-label classification problem, let
yk =1, then the above loss can be expressed as below:
`(θ ;x,y) =− f (θ ;x,yk)+ log(
m
∑
j=1
e f (θ ;x,y j)).
Model Robustness
Now we introduce the definitions and formulations of the
model robustness. Assuming that the test set Z can be di-
vided into K disjoint subsets, then the number of these par-
titions is denoted as the covering number of the set Z .
ε-cover. Given a specified metric ρ , for subsets T and Tˆ
of Z , set Tˆ is called an ε - cover of set T if Tˆ satisfies: for
any t ∈ T , there exists tˆ ∈ Tˆ such that ρ(t, tˆ)≤ ε .
ε-covering number. Refer to the concept in (Wellner and
others 2013), the ε - covering number of set T is defined
as N(ε,T ,ρ), which indicates the smallest covering number
among all of the ε - covers of set T .
Let the partition Ci and Cˆi respectively denotes the set of
data samples that objectively should be classified and the
set of data samples that actually is classified in i-th class.
Therefore, the points of i-th class in sample set can be re-
garded as the subset of their intersection, i.e., ⊂ (Ci ∩ Cˆi).
More precisely, we use CTi and CEi to represent Ci ∩ Cˆi and
Ci\(Ci ∩ Cˆi), respectively. Thus, CEi can be regarded as the
set of samples that are supposed to be classified as i-th class
but actually not, which is close to the error set of i-th class.
Adversarial robustness. The definition of adversarial ro-
bustness setRadv can be written as:
Radv = {x ∈ Rn|x ∈ (CTi )ε ∧ x /∈ CTi ∧ x ∈ Ci}. (1)
Corruption robustness. We choose Gaussian noise as the
representation in the analysis of corruptions and we have
P(A) = ∫Aϕ(x)dx as the integrals of Gaussian probability
density function. Then, ε - extension of setA can be defined
asAε = {x ∈ Rn|d(x,A)< ε}, which denotes that the origi-
nal set is “extended” by samples within a distance constraint.
Then, the corruption robustness setRcor is shown as below:
Rcor = {x ∈ Rn|x ∈ Ci∧ x /∈ Cˆi}. (2)
Therefore, P(Radv) denotes adversarial vulnerability and on
the contrary 1−P(Radv) represents adversarial robustness.
Likewise, P(Rcor) and 1−P(Rcor) stand for corruption vul-
nerability and robustness. More details can be found in The-
orem 1 and the supplementary material.
Theoretical Connections Between Adversarial and
Corruption Robustness
From above, the ε-extension of sets are defined as (CTi )ε and
(CEi )ε , where CTi denotes a set of points that should be and
actually be classified as i-th class, and CEi denotes a set of
points that should be but actually not be classified as i-th
class. In the following, we use Aε\A to represent the sur-
rounding area of ε band with respect to ε-extension of A.
More illustration can be found in the supplementary mate-
rial. Then we have the following theorem holds:
Theorem 1 For class i in single-label classification prob-
lem, we define learning function f : RD → {1, ...,K}. Then
we have
P(Cεi \Ci)−P((CTi )ε\CTi )+2P(Radv)≥
Φ(Φ−1(P(Rcor))+ ε)−P(Rcor),
where Ci is fixed and CTi \Ci is increased by augmentation.
Φ(·) represents the cumulative distribution function of nor-
mal distribution N(0,1) as shown below:
Φ(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
e−
t2
2 dt.
For probability P(Rcor)∈ (0,Φ(− ε2 )], the right hand side of
inequality Φ(Φ−1(P(Rcor))+ ε)−P(Rcor) is a monotoni-
cally increasing function of P(Rcor).
For the proof and explanation, please refer to the supple-
mentary material. According to this theorem, we draw the
observation that if we enhance the adversarial robustness
by reducing P(Radv), the intersection of Cˆi and Ci will in-
creases with Ci staying the same, which results in the rise
of (CTi )ε\CTi , leading to the smaller left-side inequality, i.e.
the tighter upper bound of right-side inequality. Thus, when
P(Rcor) is in this proved interval, the stronger corruption ro-
bustness can be provable as well. Thus, we draw a key con-
clusion that there exists a positive correlation between ad-
versarial and corruption robustness under some constraints.
Based on the theoretical finding, we can further explain
why the existing solutions can hardly obtain the generalized
noise robustness in practice, which usually focus on either
adversarial examples or the corruptions. In the literature, in
order to improve corruption robustness, it is an intuitive idea
to add random Gaussian noise through the training process
as Gaussian data augmentation (GDA) (Ford et al. 2019).
Though proved to be effective against corruptions (Ford et
al. 2019), it has little contribution to the actual adversarial
robustness, since improving corruption robustness directly
increases the lower bound on the left side of the inequality
due to the monotonically increasing function of the right side
of the inequality which may somewhat reduce adversarial
robustness on the contrary. Meanwhile, most adversarial de-
fense methods, e.g., PGD-based adversarial training (PGD-
AT) (Madry et al. 2017), believes to improve adversarial ro-
bustness by searching the worst-case adversarial noises with
much time consumption which indeed promises good ad-
versarial robustness. However, due to the limited amount of
adversarial noises model witnessed, the reduction of Radv
will be in a restricted range on the left side of the inequality,
which in turn reflects moderate robustness to corruptions on
the right side of the inequality.
Progressive Adversarial Training
Inspired by the theoretical connections between adversarial
and corruption robustness, we propose our progressive ad-
versarial training (PAT) strategy that adds adversarial noises
with huge complexity during training to shrink Radv signif-
icantly, which leads to the larger increase of (CTi )ε\CTi with
the fixed Ci resulting in the decrease ofRcor. Thus, both ad-
versarial and corruption robustness are guaranteed.
Formulation
Sinha, Namkoong, and Duchi firstly proposed surrogate
loss, which adds the Lagrangian constraint on the original
loss function in order to approximate the worst-case pertur-
bation:
min
θ∈Θ
sup
P
{EP[`(θ ;x,y)]−λd(P,P0)},
where P refers to the robust objective distribution, P0 de-
notes original data distribution of training set, and d(P,P0)
represents the distance between distribution P and P0. The
process indirectly constrains d(P,P0) by optimizing the sur-
rogate loss, meanwhile the augmented distribution approxi-
mates the robust distribution P.
Analogously, let ‖ · ‖ denotes the l2 metric, we consider
the surrogate loss with constraint as:
φλ (θ ;x,y) = minθ
sup
δ
[`(θ ;x,y,δ )− λ
2
‖δ‖2], (3)
where δ represents the worst-case perturbation which ap-
proximates the objective robust distribution on current dis-
tribution Pi. In this sense, we could update the parameter in
the direction of robustness with the optimization of surro-
gate loss. Our Progressive Adversarial Training method is
developed to minimize robust surrogate loss.
Prior studies (Schmidt et al. 2018; Sun, Zhu, and Lin
2019) have shown that the sample complexity plays a criti-
cal role in training a robust deep model. Schmidt et al. con-
cluded that the sample complexity of robust learning can be
significantly larger than that of standard learning under ad-
versarial robustness situation. Charles et al. believed that ad-
versarial training may need exponentially more iterations to
obtain large margins compared to standard training. More-
over, based on a risk decomposition theorem, (Zhai et al.
2019) theoretically and empirically showed that with more
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Figure 1: The effect of data augmentation on classification,
where the dashed circles denote the partition of the empirical
risk minimization. (a) The solid circles denote the partitions
of PGD-AT and GDA. (b) The solid circle represents the
partition of our proposed PAT.
unlabeled data, we can learn a model with better adversari-
ally robust generalization. From the view of data complex-
ity, we introduce Progressive Adversarial Training which in-
jects adversarial noises progressively during several itera-
tions within each training step, and thus we increase data
complexity and diversity leading to robust models.
Specifically, given a training data s = (x,y), we assume
δ ∗ as the local optimal perturbation obtained through the
gradient ascent. To get the local optimal perturbation δ ∗, we
calculate the perturbation gradient with respect to s as:
∇δ ∗φλ (θ ;s,δ ∗) = ∇δ ∗`(θ ;s,δ ∗)−λ‖δ ∗‖. (4)
Since data complexity contributes significantly to adver-
sarially robust model, progressive iteration process has
been proposed to introduce diversified adversarial examples
through k adversarial ascent steps. Thus, the perturbation δ ∗
can be updated in every step during the progressive process
as:
δ ∗← (1−β )δ ∗+ ε
k
· ∇δ ∗`(θ ;s,δ
∗)
‖∇δ ∗`(θ ;s,δ ∗)‖
, (5)
where ε is the step size and it is normalized by the number
of steps k, so that the overall magnitude of update equals ε .
β here controls perturbation decay with the increase of pro-
gressive iterations as well as the contribution of the former
perturbation δ ∗.
During each perturbation computation step via gradient
ascent, another batch of adversarial examples is obtained as
x← x+ δ ∗, thus another one-step gradient descent is exe-
cuted to promote the model parameters update. Obviously,
k‖∇δ ∗`(θ ;s)‖=‖k∇δ ∗`(θ ;s)‖. With the surrogate loss opti-
mizing, we have
δ ∗← δ ∗+ ε‖k∇δ ∗`(θ ;s,δ ∗)‖
· [∇δ ∗`(θ ;s,δ ∗)−λδ ∗], (6)
where λ=β‖k∇δ ∗`(θ ;s)‖/ε , according to equation (5) and
(6). In this way, progressive adversarial training can be re-
garded as the optimization of robust surrogate loss in an it-
erative way.
In the case of PGD-AT, it attempts to update the model
parameters with the approximated worst-case perturbations
computed and added within current data for one step only.
Algorithm 1 Progressive Adversarial Training
Input: Training set S = {si}ni=1 = {(xi,yi)}ni=1, Hyper-
parameters β , ε , k
Output: Updated parameters θ
1: for i in n training examples do
2: for j in k iterative steps do
3: δ j← (1−β )δ j + εk ·
∇δ j `(θ ;x
j
i ,yi,δ
j)
‖∇δ j `(θ ;x
j
i ,yi,δ j)‖
4: x ji ← x ji +δ j
5: Updates parameter θ with augmented (x ji ,yi)
6: end for
7: end for
Meanwhile, GDA-based approach tries to improve model
robustness by adding the average-case perturbations. Differ-
ent from them, our method tends to augment current data
and update model parameters for k steps, which significantly
brings more data with higher complexity and diversity. Fur-
thermore, these perturbations are much more intended and
flexible when they are calculated in each step during train-
ing. Therefore, the models trained by PAT are expected to be
robust against more types of noises, including both adversar-
ial examples and corruptions (see the proof in Theorem 1).
Intuitively, as illustrated in Figure 1 (a), the data partition
Cˆi for the i-th class becomes moderately narrow after tra-
ditional data augmentation (GDA and PGD-AT), which in-
dicates that the partition space is “stretched” to cover more
adversarial examples or Gaussian noises in some specific di-
rections (Shaham, Yamada, and Negahban 2018). However,
it directly declines the model generalization ability to be-
nign examples as partition Cˆi fails to cover some portions of
benign instances that are used to be classified correctly by
empirical risk minimization (ERM). On the contrary, after
PAT, as shown in Figure 1 (b), the capacity of data partition
Cˆi becomes larger when more data with higher diversities is
witnessed by the model during training. Thus, PAT promises
a model with excellent generalization ability on benign ex-
amples as well as polluted ones.
Generalization and Robustness
Now, we further explain and theoretically prove the robust-
ness and the upper bound on the expected generalization er-
ror for our algorithm. For the loss function `(θ ;z), obviously
there exist upper bounds M0 and M1, such that |`(θ ;z)| ≤M0
and ‖∇z`(θ ;z)‖ ≤M1.
Assumption 1 For the test set Z and l2 metric ‖ · ‖, as-
suming that the loss function is smooth. Then there ex-
ist L0 and L1, such that |`(θ ;z)− `(θ ;z′)| ≤ L0‖z− z′‖,
‖∇z`(θ ;z)−∇z′`(θ ;z′)‖ ≤ L1‖z− z′‖.
Lemma 1 ([(Xu and Mannor 2012),Theorem 14]). For the
set Z and l2 metric ‖ · ‖, if `(θ ;z) satisfies L0-Lipschitzian,
then for augmented training set S and ∀γ > 0, fS(θ ; ·) is
(N(γ/2,Z,‖ · ‖),γL0)-robust. That is to say, Z can be par-
titioned into K = N(γ/2,Z,‖ · ‖) disjoint sets {Ci}Ki=1, such
that ∀s ∈ S ,
s,z ∈ Ci⇒ |`(θ ;s)− `(θ ;z)| ≤ γL0.
Theorem 2 If loss function `(θ ;z) satisfies L0-Lipschitzian
and ∇z`(θ ;z) satisfies L1-Lipschitzian, then for existing up-
per bound M0 and M1, the surrogate loss φλ (θ ;z) satisfies
Lλ -Lipschitzian. For augmented training set S and ∀γ > 0,
fS(θ ; ·) is (K,γLλ )-robust, where Lλ = L0 + 2M1L1+1λ , K =
N(γ/2,Z,‖ · ‖).
The robust property in Lemma 1 reveals that, for the num-
ber of partition K and a sample z, if z falls into the same par-
tition as s, then the deviation between their losses could be
controlled by γL0. Here we obtain the (N(γ/2,Z,‖ ·‖),γL)-
robust by Lipschitzian property in Lemma 1. If γ increases,
the covering number N(γ/2,Z,‖ · ‖) will decrease and γL0
will increase for a fixed Lipschitz constant, which promises
the balance of the robust property. In Theorem 2 we derive
the robust property of learning function for surrogate loss.
The proof is shown in the supplementary material.
Theorem 3 Given augmented training set S and fS(θ ; ·)
satisfying (K,γLλ )-robust, then for any probability p > 0,
there is at least probability 1− p such that surrogate loss
satisfies
φλ (θ ;z)≤
1
n
n
∑
i=1
ˆ`(θ ;z)+ γLλ +M0(
√
2K ln2−2ln p
n
)+
M21
λ −L1 ,
where Lλ = L0 +
2M1L1+1
λ , K = N(γ/2,Z,‖ · ‖),n = |S|
denotes the volume of S.
In Theorem 3, we analyze the generalization error up-
per bound for the surrogate loss of our proposed PAT. The
proof is in the supplementary material. The difference be-
tween losses could be constrained in γLλ with similar input
examples. There is a balance between K and γLλ . If γ in-
creases, then the former K decreases and γLλ increases at
the same time, which promises a reasonable generalization
bound with the robust property. Thus, according to the theo-
retical analysis above, we can draw the conclusion that PAT
builds robust model with proved upper bound on the gener-
alization error.
Experiment and Evaluation
In this section, we will evaluate our Progressive Adversarial
Training with other compared methods on the image classifi-
cation task against both adversarial and corrupted examples.
We adopt the popular MNIST (LeCun 1998), CIFAR-10
(Krizhevsky and Hinton 2009) and SVHN (Netzer et al.
2011) as the evaluation datasets in our experiments. As for
the deep models, we also choose the widely-used models,
such as LeNet-5 (LeCun et al. 1998) with simple architec-
ture for MNIST, VGG-16 (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014)
for CIFAR-10 and standard ResNet-18 (He et al. 2016) for
SVHN, respectively. For the compared methods, different
data augmentation methods are employed including PGD-
AT and GDA.
Evaluation Protocol
We first evaluate the model robustness with top-1 classifi-
cation accuracy respectively on benign, adversarial and cor-
rupted datasets, following the guidelines from (Carlini et al.
2019). Meanwhile, we also use our proposed criterion Mixed
Test to evaluate the generalization ability of model, where
each test set is mixed with benign, adversarial and corrupted
examples in the same proportion.
Adversarial examples. Following (Kurakin, Goodfellow,
and Bengio 2017; Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018; Car-
lini et al. 2019), we construct adversarial examples with
the strongest attacks in different norms from both gradient-
based attack and optimization-based attack including: Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al. 2017) attack
and C&W attack (Carlini and Wagner 2017). For CIFAR-
10 and SVHN, we set the lin f -perturbation size ε of PGD
as 2/255 and 4/255, and set the l2-perturbation size c of
C&W as 0.2 and 0.5, which is similar to (Tsuzuku, Sato,
and Sugiyama 2018).
Corruptions. Following (Hendrycks and Dietterich 2019),
we constructed corrupted datasets of CIFAR-10 and SVHN
consisting of various types corruption, e.g., noise, blur,,
weather, digital, etc. More precisely, we divide all 15 cor-
ruptions into 3 main types as noise, blur and other, with 6
severity levels. Due to the simplicity of MNIST, we do not
consider the corruptions on this dataset.
Experiment settings. For CIFAR-10 we set the volume of
the sample set as 10000, and for SVHN we set the volume
as 26032, which are the same as the official dataset. We use
SGD with momentum as an optimizer for ERM baseline, the
compared methods and our method. The training details of
the compared methods and PAT are reported in the supple-
mentary material.
Corruption and Adversarial Robustness
To comprehensively evaluate model robustness, we conduct
the experiment on clean, adversarial and corrupted datasets,
respectively. and we compare our PAT (iteration step k=3)
with ERM (Naive), PGD-AT and GDA.
Figure 2 shows the accuracy performance of different
methods, from which we can get the following observations:
(1) It is obvious that GDA achieves good performance for
all types of corruptions, which meets part of the assumption
in Theorem 1. However, the Radv for GDA could be less
than PAT due to the lack of adversarial robust augmentation,
and thus leads to weak adversarial robustness. (2) PGD-AT
performs poorly on corruptions and clean examples, which
might derive from the decrease of CTi in Theorem 1, leading
to the looser upper bound and weaker corruption robustness
compared to PAT. (3) For all cases, models trained by PAT
consistently achieve the most robust performance under both
adversarial examples and corruptions, which means that PAT
brings more data with higher complexity. In this way, Radv
shrinks significantly and (CTi )ε\CTi increases, which leads to
a tighter upper bound and the stronger adversarial robustness
as well as corruption robustness.
Generalization Evaluation with Mixed Test
Xu and Mannor firstly explored a deep connection between
model robustness and generalization. They proved that a
weak notion of robustness is both sufficient and necessary
for generalization ability. Intuitively, if the test data is simi-
lar to training data, then the corresponding test error should
Table 1: Experiment results using Mixed Test on CIFAR-10 and SVHN with VGG-16 and ResNet18, respectively. We combine
benign, adversarial and corrupted examples into the test set in the same proportion.
VGG16 (lin f ) Cln+(ε=2)+Blur Cln+(ε=4)+Blur Cln+(ε=2)+Noise Cln+(ε=4)+Noise Cln+(ε=2)+Other Cln+(ε=4)+Other Cln+(ε=2)+All Cln+(ε=4)+All
Naive 69.04% 60.53% 65.78% 57.27% 72.20% 63.69% 69.01% 60.50%
PGD-AT 80.75% 75.40% 81.06% 75.71% 81.04% 75.69% 80.95% 75.60%
GDA 79.45% 71.00% 81.40% 72.95% 81.32% 72.87% 80.72% 72.27%
PAT 84.80% 79.75% 85.48% 80.43% 85.53% 80.48% 85.27% 80.22%
VGG16 (l2) Cln+(c=0.2)+Blur Cln+(c=0.5)+Blur Cln(c=0.2)+Noise Cln+(c=0.5)+Noise Cln+(c=0.2)+Other Cln+(c=0.5)+Other Cln+(c=0.2)+All Cln+(c=0.5)+All
Naive 60.86% 60.84% 57.60% 57.58% 64.02% 64.00% 60.83% 60.81%
PGD-AT 69.55% 67.40% 69.86% 67.72% 69.84% 67.69% 69.75% 67.60%
GDA 62.48% 61.03% 64.44% 62.99% 64.35% 62.90% 63.76% 62.31%
PAT 74.09% 71.55% 74.77% 72.22% 74.82% 72.27% 74.56% 72.01%
ResNet18 (lin f ) Cln+(ε=2)+Blur Cln+(ε=4)+Blur Cln+(ε=2)+Noise Cln+(ε=4)+Noise Cln+(ε=2)+Other Cln+(ε=4)+Other Cln+(ε=2)+All Cln+(ε=4)+All
Naive 86.42% 77.53% 83.84% 74.94% 86.50% 77.61% 85.59% 76.69%
PGD-AT 89.51% 82.28% 89.17% 81.94% 89.37% 82.15% 89.35% 82.12%
GDA 89.49% 82.08% 89.05% 81.65% 88.77% 81.36% 89.10% 81.70%
PAT 92.62% 87.68% 92.20% 87.26% 91.84% 86.89% 92.22% 87.28%
ResNet18 (l2) Cln+(c=0.2)+Blur Cln+(c=0.5)+Blur Cln+(c=0.2)+Noise Cln+(c=0.5)+Noise Cln+(c=0.2)+Other Cln+(c=0.5)+Other Cln+(c=0.2)+All Cln+(c=0.5)+All
Naive 65.62% 65.99% 63.03% 63.40% 65.70% 66.07% 64.78% 65.15%
PGD-AT 71.58% 67.33% 71.24% 66.99% 71.44% 67.19% 71.42% 67.17%
GDA 72.14% 67.58% 71.70% 67.14% 71.42% 66.86% 71.75% 67.19%
PAT 83.28% 70.76% 82.86% 70.34% 82.49% 69.97% 82.88% 70.36%
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(a) VGG16 on CIFAR-10
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(b) ResNet18 on SVHN
Figure 2: Model robustness evaluation on adversarial and
corrupted examples of CIFAR-10 and SVHN. We evaluate
corruption robustness on the clean and corrupted datasets,
and adversarial robustness under PGD and C&W attack. The
parameter setting and the experimental results of MNIST are
reported in the supplementary material.
also be close to empirical training error as well. Previous ad-
versarial related studies (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018;
Xie et al. 2018) usually evaluate the accuracy of model on
individual type of examples, i.e., test set only contains ad-
versarial examples or clean examples, and observe the gap
between test and training error to obtain generalization abil-
ity. However, for models trained on dataset augmented with
noises, e.g., adversarial examples, it is prejudiced and biased
to evaluate model generalization on any specified type of
test data, which turns out to be very different from the train-
ing set. Therefore, we believe that it is reasonable to evalu-
ate model generalization and robustness with mixed types of
samples under the noise situation, especially for those mod-
els trained with data augmentation containing noises. Thus,
we propose Mixed Test to fairly evaluate model generaliza-
tion ability, which combines clean, adversarial and corrupted
examples in an equal proportion.
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Figure 3: The corruption and adversarial robustness evalua-
tion of Progressive Adversarial Training on CIFAR-10, with
the iteration step k ranging from 1 to 6.
The experimental results using Mixed Test on CIFAR-10
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Figure 4: Visualization of the gradients with respect to the
input images via different training strategies on CIFAR-10.
and SVHN are shown in Table 1. In order to conduct fair
experiment, we keep all adversarial attack methods and cor-
ruption types the same as the section above. Obviously, PAT
outperforms other data augmentation methods, i.e., PGD-AT
and GDA, with big margins, showing the strongest general-
ization ability. As discussed before in Figure 1, since PGD-
AT and GDA could increase model robustness against spe-
cific noise, e.g., obtaining higher adversarial accuracy, they
fail to cover some portions of benign examples that are used
to be classified by ERM, leading to weaker generalization
ability. Also, it is interesting to see that the accuracy of GDA
and ERM (Naive) drops more drastically compared to PGD-
AT and PAT, when adversarial perturbation (e.g. ε or c) in-
creases. This phenomenon further demonstrates the strong
adversarial defense ability of PGD-AT and PAT.
Effects of Progressive Iteration
Our PAT relies on multiple progressive iterations to largely
improve the noise diversity injected into deep models. To
further investigate the effect of progressive iteration on
model robustness and generalization, we conduct an experi-
ment on PAT with different iterative step k. In fact, the it-
eration step k in our method can be regarded as the data
augmentation times. From the results in Figure 3, we can
draw two meaningful conclusions. Firstly, as the accuracy
increases on clean examples, model robustness drops, which
indicates that there exists a trade-off between accuracy and
robustness in practice. Secondly, for a fixed perturbation
threshold ε , the larger k, bringing larger data complexities
and diversities during training, indeed supplies models with
stronger adversarial and corruption robustness. Though the
model robustness improves with more iteration steps, the
training time consumption rises sharply at the same time.
Moreover, the model robustness gradually saturates with a
larger k, e.g., 5 or 6. Therefore, in practice we can simply
choose a moderate value for k (e.g., 3) in order to keep the
balance between robustness, accuracy and training time.
Feature Alignment with Human Vision
Beyond measuring the performance of model robustness and
generalization with digital indicators (e.g., accuracy), we
also try to discover model robustness more intuitively and
perceptually using visualization techniques from the view
of feature alignment with human vision. Since the stronger
model generates gradients that are better aligned with hu-
man visual perception (Tsipras et al. 2018), we normalize
and visualize the gradient of loss with respect to the input
images on CIFAR-10. As shown in Figure 4, the gradients
for Naive model turn out to be noises and appear meaning-
less to human, and those for PGD-AT and GDA are less per-
ceptually aligned with human vision, e.g., too light, fewer
outlines, etc. Among all methods, it is easy to observe that
the gradients for PAT align much better with perceptually
relevant features to human visual perception. This is mainly
because that, in order to make consistent predictions, salient
objects and critical features must be recognized more easily
which result in robust and stable representations obtained
from robust model itself. Thus, more broadly, robustness is
more likely to be a reliable property for models which offers
a path to build more human-aligned applications.
Conclusions
In this paper, we first theoretically established the connec-
tions between adversarial robustness and corruption robust-
ness, by introducing a formal and uniform definition of the
model robustness. Based on the surprising finding, we pro-
posed a powerful training method named Progressive Adver-
sarial Training (PAT), where diversified adversarial noises
are aggregated, augmented and injected progressively to si-
multaneously guarantee both adversarial and corruption ro-
bustness. Theoretical analyses have been dedicated to prov-
ing the upper bound of model generalization and robust-
ness, which in turn promise model with strong generaliza-
tion ability and robustness against noises. Extensive exper-
iments on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN show that PAT
comprehensively performs well compared to various aug-
mentation methods.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2 (Gaussian Isoperimetric Inequality).
Φ−1(γ(Ah))≥Φ−1(γ(A))+h, (1)
where γ(·) denotes Gaussian measure, and the set Ah is
called the h-extension respect to set A. Here, we give the
the proof of Theorem 1.
Recall the definitions of CTi , CEi and Ci in subsection Mod-
el Robustness and Theorem 1, the definition and illustration
of ε-extension in the same subsection and Figure 1, as well
as the robustness setsRcor andRadv. Intuitively, the smaller
volume ofRcor andRadv , the stronger robustness the model
performs.
iC 
iC
T
iCcor( )
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iC R

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advR advR
Figure 1: The relationship between adversarial and corrup-
tion robustness set.
As illustrated in Figure 1, we define the ε-band of set Aε
as Aε\A. With Lemma 2, we could obtain that,
P(Rεcor) = P(Rcor)+P(Rεcor\Rcor)
= P(Rcor)+P(Cεi \Ci)−P((CTi )ε\CTi )+2P(Radv)
≥Φ(Φ−1(P(Rcor))+ ε).
In the training process, if Radv shrinks with data augmen-
tation, the intersection of Cˆi and Ci increases, while Ci stays
∗Contribute Equally.
†Corresponding author.
the same. This will lead to the increase in (CTi )ε\CTi which
can be written as an inequality shown below:
P(Cεi \Ci)−P((CTi )ε\CTi )+2P(Radv)≥
Φ(Φ−1(P(Rcor))+ ε)−P(Rcor).
Therefore, the left hand side of the above inequality decreas-
es, i.e. the upper bound of right hand side decreases. We will
prove the monotone interval in the following paragraph.
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Figure 2: The monotone interval of G(x).
Given the function G(x) = Φ(Φ−1(x) + ε)− x, we will
prove the monotone interval of G(x) in a geometric view.
Figure 2 represents the probability density function φ(t) =
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 of N(0,1). According to the definition, the left area
of shaded lines denotes x in G(x) with the corresponding
abscissa of shaded area denoted as Φ−1(x). Then we add
ε to Φ−1(x) and obtain Φ(Φ−1(x) + ε), which is the sum
of left shaded area and crossed area, i.e., the integral of the
right crossed area’s abscissa. Thus, it is reasonable to say the
crossed area denotes G(x). In this way, with the increasing
of Φ−1(x) on negative half axis, the area of G(x) increases
and achieve maximum value until Φ−1(x)=− ε2 , where G(x)
reaches the maximum when x=Φ(− ε2 ). Therefore, G(x) is
monotonic increasing when x ∈ (0,Φ(− ε2 )], which explain-
s Theorem 1 that corruption robustness increases with the
ascent of adversarial robustness.
Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 3 ([(Volpi et al. 2018), Claim 5]). For surrogate
loss satisfying Assumption 1, we have
φλ (θ ;z) = `(θ ;z)+
1
λ
‖∇z`(θ ;z)‖2+O( 1
λ 2
), (2)
and
φλ (θ ;z)≤ `(θ ;z)+
1
λ −L1 ‖∇z`(θ ;z)‖
2. (3)
According to Lemma 3 and Assumption 1, for z,z′ ∈ Z
we have:
|φλ (θ ;z)−φλ (θ ;z′)|= `(θ ;z)+
1
λ
‖∇z`(θ ;z)‖2+O( 1λ 2 )
− `(θ ;z′)− 1
λ
‖∇z′`(θ ;z′)‖2−O(
1
λ 2
)
≤ |`(θ ;z)− `(θ ;z′)|+ 2M1
λ
|‖∇z`(θ ;z)‖
−‖∇z′`(θ ;z′)‖|+O(
1
λ 2
)
≤ L0‖z− z′‖+ 2M1λ L1‖z− z
′‖+O( 1
λ 2
)
≤ (L0+ 2M1L1+1λ )‖z− z
′‖.
Thus, surrogate loss satisfies Lλ -Lipschitzian. According to
Lemma 1, for all γ > 0 we obtain (K,γLλ ) robust, where
K = N(γ/2,Z,‖ · ‖) denotes γ/2-covering number of Z in
metric ‖ · ‖.
Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 4 ([(Xu and Mannor 2012),Theorem 3]). If fS(θ ; ·)
satisfies (K,γLλ ) robust, for probability p > 0, there exists
at least probability of 1− p, such that
`(θ ; ·)≤ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
ˆ`(θ ; ·)+ γLλ +M0(
√
2K ln2+2ln( 1p )
n
),
(4)
where ˆ` and K denotes empirical training loss and the
number of partitions after classification on Z , respectively.
According to Assumption 1 and Lemma 3, then we have in-
equality below:
φλ (θ ;z)≤ `(θ ;z)+
1
λ −L1 ‖∇z`(θ ;z)‖
2 ≤ M
2
1
λ −L1 .
Meanwhile, according to Lemma 4 and Theorem 2, for
z,z′ ∈ Z and ∀γ > 0, we could obtain the upper bound of
our surrogate loss as follows:
φλ (θ ;z)≤ `(θ ;z)+
1
λ −L1 ‖∇z`(θ ;z)‖
2
≤ `(θ ;z)+ M
2
1
λ −L1
≤ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
ˆ`(θ ;z)+(L0+
2M1L1+1
λ
)γ
+M0(
√
2N(γ/2,Z,‖ · ‖) ln2−2ln p
n
)+
M21
λ −L1
=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
ˆ`(θ ;z)+ γLλ +M0(
√
2K ln2−2ln p
n
)+
M21
λ −L1 ,
where K = N(γ/2,Z,‖ ·‖) denotes γ/2-covering number of
Z in distance metric ‖ · ‖, and n = |S| stands for the volume
of augmented dataset.
More Experimental Results
In this section, we give more experimental results including
the robustness evaluation on MNIST, the effects of progres-
sive iteration and the feature alignment with human vision.
As for the experiment settings, we set the SGD momen-
tum factor in optimizer as 0.9. We train 80 epochs for each
method on CIFAR-10 and SVHN, and 40 epochs on MNIST.
Specifically, for augmentation method PGD-AT in the train-
ing process, we mixed benign and adversarial examples in e-
qual proportion, following the recommendation of (Kurakin,
Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016).
For PGD-AT on lin f metric, we set perturbation ε=8/255,
step size α=ε/10 and iteration step k=10. For GDA, we add
noise N(0,σ) on training set and fix σ=0.1. For our progres-
sive adversarial training method on l2 metric, we set pertur-
bation ε=1.0, β=0.5 and iteration step k=3. Motivated by
Curriculum Learning (Bengio et al. 2009), we gradually add
perturbation ε in PAT.
Robustness Evaluation on MNIST
For the simplicity of MNIST, corruption robustness is not
considered. We only consider the robustness of model on ad-
versarial examples. Among those attack methods, for PGD
attack, we set the parameters as ε=0.1 and 0.2, step size
α=ε/10 and iteration k=10. As for C&W attack, we set per-
turbation to c=0.1 and 0.2. The evaluation results can be
found in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Robustness evaluation on MNIST with LeNet-5.
Table 1: Generalization evaluation of mixed results on CIFAR-10, with the different iteration step k ranging from 1 to 6.
VGG16(lin f ) Cln+(ε=2)+Blur Cln+(ε=4)+Blur Cln+(ε=2)+Noise Cln+(ε=4)+Noise Cln+(ε=2)+Other Cln+(ε=4)+Other Cln+(ε=2)+All Cln+(ε=4)+All
PAT(k=1) 68.22% 59.46% 65.27% 56.51% 71.39% 62.63% 68.30% 59.54%
PAT(k=2) 85.02% 79.72% 85.42% 80.12% 85.78% 80.48% 85.41% 80.10%
PAT(k=3) 84.80% 79.75% 85.48% 80.43% 85.53% 80.48% 85.27% 80.22%
PAT(k=4) 84.75% 80.22% 85.31% 80.78% 85.39% 80.86% 85.15% 80.62%
PAT(k=5) 84.44% 79.82% 84.99% 80.37% 85.04% 80.42% 84.82% 80.20%
PAT(k=6) 84.72% 80.13% 85.52% 80.93% 85.58% 80.99% 85.27% 80.68%
VGG16(l2) Cln+(c=0.2)+Blur Cln+(c=0.5)+Blur Cln+(c=0.2)+Noise Cln+(c=0.5)+Noise Cln+(c=0.2)+Other Cln+(c=0.5)+Other Cln+(c=0.2)+All Cln+(c=0.5)+All
PAT(k=1) 60.12% 60.32% 57.17% 57.38% 63.29% 63.50% 60.20% 60.40%
PAT(k=2) 72.90% 67.56% 73.30% 67.96% 73.66% 68.32% 73.29% 67.95%
PAT(k=3) 74.09% 71.55% 74.77% 72.22% 74.82% 72.27% 74.56% 72.01%
PAT(k=4) 78.53% 72.01% 79.08% 72.57% 79.17% 72.65% 78.93% 72.41%
PAT(k=5) 80.38% 73.13% 80.93% 73.68% 80.99% 73.74% 80.77% 73.52%
PAT(k=6) 79.89% 71.76% 80.70% 72.57% 80.76% 72.63% 80.45% 72.32%
Effects of Progressive Iteration
In this part, we give more details of the experiment on mod-
els with different progressive iterations. For the robustness
and generalization evaluation in Table 1, we observe that as
iteration step k increases, PAT performs stronger adversar-
ial robustness on both lin f and l2 adversarial examples, as
well as stronger corruption robustness on noise corruption
set. However, no obvious increase is witnessed on blur and
other corruption sets after k >2. In conclusion, the progres-
sive iteration mechanism can significantly improve model
robustness on both adversarial and corruption conditions.
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Figure 4: Feature alignment with human vision.
Feature Alignment with Human Vision
We believe that, gradient features become more perceptu-
ally relevant with human perception as the model becomes
stronger, which we can also find similar points from (Tsipras
et al. 2018). Thus, we visualize the gradient of loss with re-
spect to inputs on CIFAR-10. Here is the additional visual-
ization results of feature alignment.
From the visualization of gradients shown in Figure 4, we
can observe distinctly that gradients become more semanti-
cally meaningful as model becomes more robust, i.e, from
PGD-AT to PAT incrementally.
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